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Abstract  
The vast majority of electronic markets have been based purely on a single variable (price) as the 
factor that determines ‘the winner’.  Multi-attribute auctions are likely to be more appropriate for 
procurement scenarios where factors other than price need to be considered in determining the 
outcome. Nevertheless, there is a scarcity of empirical research on multi-attribute electronic auctions. 
In particular, there is little empirical evidence of how multi-attribute auctions fit with our theoretical 
conceptualisation of electronic markets. This paper uses the market design aspects of multi-attribute 
auctions to explore a multivariable electronic auction, using frameworks from electronic market 
process design and systematic sourcing. Evidence from the case study illustrates that multi-variable 
electronic auctions can be used to procure a wider range of operating and manufacturing input that 
has been considered possible with traditional, price only, auctions. The findings reveal how the use of 
an electronic auction intermediary creates a middle ground of interaction between spot and systematic 
sourcing, by automating for the buyer certain general parameters and trade context processes.  
Keywords: Multi-variable auctions, Strategic Sourcing, Procurement, Case Research. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Auctions are used as a price determination process within markets when sufficient competition exists, 
involving non-standardized products and/or products with unstable prices (Milgrom, 1989). Indeed it 
is the determination of the transaction price that characterizes different types of auctions (Wilson, 
1992; Rothkopf and Harstadt, 1994). Most discussions of auction differentiate between open and 
closed, or English and Dutch, auctions  (Ribbers et al., 2002; Wonseok, 2002). The vast majority of 
electronic markets have been based purely on a single variable (price) as the factor that determines 
‘the winner’. Bichler et al. (1999) discuss the concept of multi-attribute auctions and propose that such 
auctions are likely to be more appropriate for procurement scenarios where factors other than price 
need to be considered in determining the outcome. However, Bichler et al. (1999) conclude that much 
work needs to be conducted in the area of multivariable auctions to determine the degree to which 
classic auction theory can be applied to such auctions.   
This paper utilises the electronic market process design work of Ribbers et al. (2002) and Kambil and 
van Heck (1998), as well as the work of Kaplan and Sawhney (2000) on systematic sourcing, to 
conduct an exploratory study of an electronic market utilising a multi-attribute auction mechanism. A 
comparison of our findings with existing electronic market theories illustrates that the use of an 
electronic auction intermediary creates a middle ground of interaction between spot and systematic 
sourcing, by automating for the buyer certain general parameters and trade context processes. 
2 THEORETICAL GROUNDING 
Wonseok (2002) notes that the growth in revenues associated with electronic auctions remains strong 
despite the slowdown in other electronic business activities, and attributes much of this success to the 
economic efficiency of the price discovery mechanisms of electronic auctions. The success of auctions 
has been studied in so far as they are seen as mechanisms within an electronic marketplace. Using the 
work of a number of researchers and an examination of the Dutch Flower Auction, Ribbers et al. 
(2002) classify electronic market success as a derivative of market design as shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Electronic market framework (From Ribbers et al. 2002) 
The first element, buyers, are characterised by their number, by the expectations with which they enter 
the market (such as the kind of products and services they expect e.g. standardized or customer 
specific), and their buying behaviour (e.g. their bidding strategies). Buyers affect success as buyer 
participation has to meet conditions of critical mass; the motives of the buyers will determine the 
required performance measures of that market.  
The second element, objects (exchanged products) have certain characteristics. Asset specificity and 
complexity of product description are proposed as factors affecting the possibility of a product to be 
traded through an electronic market (Malone et al., 1987). Analogous to buyers, sellers can be 
characterised by their number, the expectations with which they enter the market, and their strategies. 
Critical mass and sellers’ expectations affect the success of the market.  
Market organization refers to the structure of key market processes, such as price discovery, 
information exchange, and logistics. Basically it refers to how and by whom different tasks are carried 
out and coordinated. The key issues in relation to market organization are intermediaries, market 
process design, IT-innovation, and trust. 
According to Lee and Clark (1996), electronic markets are created by ‘market making firms’ or 
‘intermediaries’. Intermediaries are motivated by regular economic performance indicators - such as 
total revenue, profit, and number of transactions realized. The effectiveness of electronic markets 
depends on how critical processes are designed.  The literature provides examples of 
descriptive/qualitative issues supporting an effective market process design. Kambil and Van Heck 
(1998) specified a generalisable model of exchange processes. As shown in Figure 2, the framework 
distinguishes five trade processes (search, valuation, logistics, payments and settlements, 
authentication) and five trade context processes (communication and computing, product 
representation, legitimisation, influence, and dispute resolution). 
 
Figure 2.  Market Process Design (From Kambil and Van Heck, 1998) 
The issue of IT innovation posits that trading processes will be affected by increasing bandwidth and 
ICT convergence, facilitating electronic communication, electronic coordination, and electronic 
brokerage (Malone et al., 1987). In addition, the trust element posits that buyers and sellers may be 
confronted with opportunistic behaviours of their counterparts. Trust can be defined as the belief, or 
willingness to believe, that one party can rely on the fairness, goodness, strength, and the ability of the 
other party (e.g. the seller, the buyer) (Fukuyama, 1995). Trust applies to different transaction parts. 
Buyers expect delivery of the right products, of the right quality, and at the right time. Sellers expect 
payments as parties have agreed.  
Market quality refers to effectiveness and efficiency of trading on that market. The literature provides 
some measures. For example Clemons and Weber (1990) characterize financial markets in terms of 
liquidity, volatility, and transparency. Liquidity is an important attribute of a financial market’s 
attractiveness. It measures the investor’s ability to liquidate a position – that is, to convert a security 
into cash or cash back into a security, without delay, and without the transaction having an excessive 
effect on the price at which the security is bought and sold. Schwartz (1998) measures a market’s 
attractiveness in terms of liquidity, accessibility, transaction costs, accurate price discovery, and 
adequate information about products, transactions, and quotes. Apparently, specific measures depend 
on the type of market.  
While competition with other markets is an important element, the literature shows that most 
researchers view markets as single isolated markets (Rothkopf and Harstad, 1994). Recent work from 
Ribbers et al. (2002) and O’ Reilly and Finnegan (2002) both propose that the success of electronic 
markets depends on two categories of factors: (I) the motives of (potential) participants, and (II) the 
level of effectiveness and efficiency of the market – expressed in terms of motives of participants.  
Much of the theory on auctions address issues such as the decision to participate, real differences 
between auctions, and maximizing expected receipts (such auctions will be chosen by the auctioneer 
and seller). The answers to these questions are typically revenue-based. The participation of bidders in 
auctions is expected to depend on expected profits in relation to costs of participation (Rothkopf and 
Harstad, 1994). In general, a gap is observed between the theory and the practice of auctions. For 
theorists, Rothkopf and Harstadt (1994) recommend paying attention to the particularities of how 
auctions are modelled. Milgrom (1989) argues that comparisons of auction institutions in terms of 
‘robustness, efficiency, transaction costs, and immunity to cheating, offer an important alternative to 
the revenue-based approaches for explaining the popularity of specific institutions’.  
More advanced conceptualisations of market auctions have been considered by Kaplan and Sawhney 
(2000). Kaplan and Sawhney (2000) placed e-auctions and e-exchanges in the category of spot buying, 





























Figure 3.  The B2B Matrix (From Kaplan and Sawhney 2000). 
Kaplan and Sawhney (2000) define systematic buying, either horizontal or vertical, as using e-hubs, 
based upon type of input. These e-hubs create value through aggregation and matching. E-hubs are 
illustrated as an aggregation mechanism for both buyer and seller in systematic sourcing. E-auctions 
and e-exchanges that are set up for one buyer to many possible sellers, for systematic buying, the 
authors call reverse auctioneers.   Kaplan and Sawhney (2000) state that these “biased e-hubs” (biased 
towards one side of the transaction) can exist as aggregators in systematic sourcing and matchers in 
spot sourcing.   
The two models presented above are based on research that examined scenarios where price was the 
only attribute examined in determining the outcome of the auction. Emerging practices that focus on 
more than one variable may challenge the applicability of much of the existing theory on electronic 
markets and auctions.  
Multi-attribute auctions automate negotiation on multiple attributes of a deal (Bichler, 2000), and are 
useful in areas such as corporate procurement as such negotiations are dependent on more than just 
price (Bichler et al. 1999). Such auctions may hold the key to higher market efficiency through a more 
effective exchange of buyer’s requirements and supplier’s offerings (Bichler and Kalagnanam (2002). 
However, the process is complex as the description of all attributes and the determination of the 
overall utility offered by various combinations of attributes is a difficult and time-consuming task 
(Bichler et al., 1999). Despite this, multi-attribute auctions are likely to be very useful in expanding 
the range of products and services that are traded using electronic markets. However, little research on 
multi-attribute electronic auctions exists (Bichler and Kalagnanam, 2002), making it important for 
researchers to examine the applicability of existing e-auction theories in light of the developments in 
multi-attribute auctions (Bichler et al., 1999). 
3 RESEARCH APPROACH 
Our objective for this study was to explore the design of multi-attribute electronic auctions, to examine 
how the market design principles and operation of these auctions may differ from traditional auctions. 
In order to operationalise this research, an exploratory case study research design was devised. Yin 
(1989) suggests that case studies are appropriate when the object is to study contemporary events, and 
where it is not necessary to control behavioural events or variables. The case study approach is 
considered appropriate as it allows the researchers to probe case details in more depth than research 
methods such as surveys and experiments. Primary data was collected via semi-structured interviews 
and document analysis. Data was gathered over a three-month period from June 2003 to August 2003. 
Six people were interviewed on a number of occasions throughout this period, including the President, 
the CIO, the IS Manager, the Auction Manager and two Business Analysts. All interviews were 
transcribed. Data was analysed using matrices. Miles and Huberman (1994) define a matrix as 
“essentially the crossing of two lists, set up as rows and columns”. The frameworks by Ribbers et al 
(2002) and Kambil and Van Heck (1998) were used to structure the within-case analysis.  
4 CASE STUDY FINDINGS 
Eutilia is a leading pan-European marketplace for the utility sector, offering source to pay services to 
buyers and suppliers. Headquartered in Leiden, the Netherlands, Eutilia is open to all companies on 
both the buy and supply sides. While being an independent marketplace, Eutilia has the financial 
backing of 11 of Europe’s largest utility providers including Electrabel (Belgium), Electricite de 
France (France), Endesa (Spain), ENEL (Italy), Iberdrola (Spain), Nuon (Netherlands) and RWE 
(Germany). These 11 organisations account for the vast majority of the annual procurement spend in 
the European utilities market. Eutilia’s services include supplier commercial assessment, e-tendering, 
e-auctions and transaction services. Eutilia was created as a result of the European commission’s 
decision to liberalise the utilities market across Europe. Indeed Eutilia's creation had to be cleared by 
the European commission as it operates in an area governed by public procurement directives. Wim 
Rietweld, CEO of Eutilia during its formation stated that the advantage of using a marketplace is “not 
so much about price, it is more about having better prices and improved transparency.” Increased 
competition and transparency were two principles which the European commission were anxious to 
encourage in the utilities sector.  
Table 1 outlines the various elements of Ribbers et al. (2002) model of electronic market success and 
Kambil and van Heck (1998) framework of market process design in the context of the Eutilia case. 
The key points from the comparison to traditional single parameter (price) auctions can been seen in 
how certain general parameters and trade context processes are enhanced by use of intermediary over 
traditional auction processes. For example, within the general parameters, suppliers are pre-qualified 
and the intermediary provides several additional value activities in market making and automation.  
The basic trade process of authentication is affected. Also, in the trade context process, product 
representation and communication are all impacted differently than in a single parameter auction. A 
fuller consideration of these parameters is represented in the following sections. 
 




Buyers Predominately used by European Utility Organisations to procure 
manufacturing (e.g. cables, transformers) and operating products 
(e.g. protective clothing, vehicles) 
Eutilia creates auctions for single 
buyers to meet multi-attribute 
requirements.  
 Sellers Preselected and prequalified international suppliers who are 
invited to participate if it is deemed that they meet buyer’s 
requirements. 
Pre-scanned across multiple 
attributes 
 Products Multi-faceted and varied. Include core (e.g. cables, transformers) 
and non-core (e.g. protective clothing, vehicles) products.  
Less homogenous products as 
MVB provides meaningful 
assessment of full offer. 
 Intermediary Eutilia facilitates the communication, selection and negotiation 
processes for buyers. It does this through it’s supplier optimisation 
services (SOS) incorporating supplier pre-qualification, supplier 
commercial assessment, e-tendering and e-auctions.  
More planning required and more 
emphasis needs to be placed on 
auction design and structure due 
to multiple attributes. Buyer 
decides whether the object 




While having no direct competitor in the European utilities sector 
for core products, it competes with markets for non-core products. 
Biggest competitor to Eutilia’s business is from the individual 
buyers traditional paper based e-tendering process 
Competition reduced due to full 
service nature of procurement 
process offered.  
Basic Trade 
Processes 
Search Buyers may utilise Eutilias database of prequalified and 
preselected suppliers to search for core and non-core products. 
Search based on multiple criteria 
 Valuation Multi variable bidding (MVB) with price being just one 
characteristic. Other variables defined by buyers on a case by case 
basis. For example in the Scottish Power / United Utilities case 
who conducted an auction for vehicles, variables such as vehicles 
residual value, repair and maintenance costs were some of the 
variables utilized. 
Auction type: English Reversed (ER), Dynamic Sealed Reverse 
(DSR) 
Valuation based on weighting of 
multiple criteria 
 Logistics Case specific on whether logistics are buyer or sellers 
responsibility – logistics may be one of the criteria utilised by 
buyers for multi variable bidding. Will be the buyers decision in 
relation to whether they want to include logisitics as one of the 
criteria in multiple variable bidding.  
Logisitics may be included as an 
evaluation criteria under MVB 
 Payments and 
Settlements 
Final contract outside scope of Eutilia. Once an auction is 
completed, confirmation is sent to the buyers either directly to the 
buyer by the supplier or through Eutilia. Final contract and 
method of settlement is outside Eutilias scope. Direct 
communication between buyers and sellers on terms and method 
of payment  
No differences observed 
 Authentication Eutilia prequalifies all suppliers who are invited and sign up for 
tenders. They collect information in relation to a supplier’s 
financial position, environmental policies and legal issues. Eutilia 
evaluate supplier’s technical ability and test all products. 
Extensive pre-qualification of 
suppliers by intermediary to 







Auctions are live through Eutilias proprietary auction software and 
conducted over the Internet. 
Ongoing as bid preparation is 
online. Sellers can determine 
ranking in advance of auction 
 Product 
representation 
As part of the qualification process, Eutilia checks the technical 
specifications and tests all products. Eutilia encourage buyers to 
move toward standardised products as there are efficiencies in the 
context of pricing. If buyers have specific needs e.g technical 
requirements, these will be incorporated in the tender 
Buyers determine how object is 
represented across multiple 
attributes 
 Legitimisation Bid validity based on output of multi-criteria analysis. Contracts 
exchanged between buyers and sellers after event. 
No difference observed 
 Influence Eutilia owned by 11 leading European utilities. It may be deemed 
to be buyer biased as it only conducts forward auctions.  
No difference observed 
 Dispute 
Resolution 
Contract between buyer and seller – Dispute resolution beyond the 
scope of Eutilia 
No difference observed 
Table 1.  Case analysis - General parameters and market process design  
4.1 The Intermediary 
The role of the intermediary, as evidenced by the Eutilia case, is different from traditional 
conceptualisations of electronic markets. Eutilia has essentially established itself as a strategic 
sourcing partner for utility industry buyers. This is evident from the manner in which Eutila 
customizes procurement auctions for each buyer, and engages in substantial pre-auction activities to 
ensure that the process meets the explicit requirements of each buyer. 
Eutilia utilises a roadmap for auction preparation in order to ensure that the process fulfils EU 
regulations. To begin, Eutilia holds discussions with the buyer to decide whether an auction is a 
suitable mechanism for the product being procured. There is no definitive model to decide on this. 
Every contract is deemed to be unique, as the procurement environment for any given product is 
continuously changing. All that can be done is to consider the market at that point in time in order to 
establish if the environment is suitable for running an auction. A critical element is the importance of 
the contract to the market. For example, Eutilia describe a scenario where a supplier is invited to an 
auction but they believe that the contract is not important. Consequently, the supplier would rather 
loose the contract than reveal their best margin. Eutilia advises buyers, but it is the buyer who decides 
whether or not to go ahead with an auction for a specific contract. At this point, a commercial contract 
is agreed with the customer. This incorporates all terms and conditions for the auction.  
The next stage is to define the auction structure. Eutilia believe that this structure is very important as 
it influences the auction result. It is possible for an auction event (contract) to consist of more than one 
auction line (product). Buyers will have to decide if they want one contract with one supplier for the 
entire event (one auction) or whether they wish to conduct a multiple auction event, thereby allowing 
for the possibility of numerous contracts. If a buyer wants a dynamic situation for each auction line 
then that needs to be reflected in the auction design.  
Eutilia have noted that a key issue for design of an auction structure is the perceived level of 
interdependency between various auction lines. For example if you have three cables (products) in an 
event, cables a, b, c. How is the outcome affected if the events are run in parallel? Will suppliers that 
lose in auction A go deeper in their prices for auction B? If buyers believe that, Eutilia need to ensure 
that auction B does not end before auction A. If it is decided that there is inter-dependency between 
auction lines, individual auction running times can be linked. There are also practical limitations to 
this when deciding on auction structure. For example, if the buyer decides to run eight lines 
simultaneously, then suppliers have to concentrate on them all, especially if they are interested in all 
product lines. For practical reasons, they should not all finish at the same time. Therefore it is clear 
that dependencies between product lines will impact upon auction structure.  
Eutilia also supports single or multi-currency bidding. Buyers may decide that it is advantageous to 
allow bidders to bid in their own currency. The opening price may be individual (per bidder) or 
general (per auction). The systems will also allow users to decide on whether to show or hide the 
opening price. It is usual to hide general opening price when current market levels are unknown. It is 
also possible to specify a minimum bid decrement. This will depend on the chosen auction type, 
English Reverse (ER) or Dynamic Sealed Reverse (DSR). It is also possible to show or hide the lead 
bid. It is usually good practice to hide the lead bid when individual prices differ hugely.  
Eutila works closely with buyers to determine an appropriate auction structure that takes into account 
the product and the prevailing market conditions. The auction structure outline the activities and 
responsibilities of both Eutilia and the customer (buyer) in organising the auction. A sample auction 
structure, showing activities over a twelve-week period, is outlined in figure one. Figure 4 illustrates 
Eutilia’s heavy involvement in organizing the auction. 
 
Figure 4.  Eutilia’s auction structure 
4.2 Authentication 
A significant value-added provided by Eutilia is the authentication provided by pre-qualification. The 
pre-qualification process may be broken down into three distinct stages. Stage one is known as 
commercial pre-qualification where Eutilia collects supplier information in relation to the suppliers 
financial condition, supplier capabilities, environmental and safety policies, outstanding legal issues 
and references. Stage two involves examining the supplier’s technical capability. This involves Eutilia 
assessing the technical ability of suppliers through supplier audits and visits. Stage three involves 
product qualification where Eutilia tests the product to ensure it meets specifications. 
The objective of supplier commercial assessment (SCA) is to provide instant pre-qualification 
information on suppliers as an input to the utility sourcing process.  The supplier scan service 
leverages the power of on-line and off-line searches for potential suppliers, supported by the market 
knowledge of Eutilia’s sourcing experts. The service can be used to generate a long list of potential 
suppliers or taken a step further to apply specific search criteria. The benefits of supplier commercial 
assessment (SCA) include shared supplier data amongst utilities, consistent pre-qualification, and 
reduced sourcing cycle times. SCA also enables the identification of new suppliers by virtue of a 
shared centralized database of utility suppliers  
Eutilia’s supplier commercial assessment (SCA) is an important advance in making the assessment 
and selection of suppliers as easy and transparent as possible for utility industry buyers. All utilities 
using SCA are obliged to share their supplier data with other users. Eutilia believe that by using the 
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 10 11 12
Who
Have GT&Cs signed by originator Customer
Have commercial contract agreed and signed by originator Customer
Discuss/agree the auction structure and  set-up with originator Eut / Cust
Send originator invitation pack to the originator Eutilia
Shortlist of suppliers available to Eutilia Customer
Send registration form to bidders (e-mail) Eutilia
Collect the bidders registration forms Eutilia
Registration of bidders Eutilia
Send user ID to bidders (by e-mail) and verify they receive it Eutilia
Give password to bidders (by phone) Eutilia
The "auction set up form(s)" available to Eutilia Customer
Prepare bidder invitation pack (customize) Eutilia
Send the invitation pack to bidders Eutilia
Test the originator software for viewing the dashboard Eut / Cust
Prepare the auction execution room and helpdesk Eutilia
Set up the bidder training events Eutilia
Internet connection check with registered bidders Eutilia
Training event bidder …… Eutilia
Training event bidder ………… Eutilia
Training event bidder ……….. Eutilia
Training event bidder ……… Eutilia
Evaluate trainings (and make adjustments if necessary) Eutilia
Set up the live auction Eutilia
Hold Live event Eutilia






SCA service it can save up to 60 days on the overall procurement process compared to traditional calls 
for competition. 
4.3 Product Representation 
Eutilia’s tendering process is fully transparent for both buyers and bidders. All questions must be 
answered in a standardised format and the buyer may choose to make certain questions mandatory. 
This enables cross tender analysis across multiple attributes. One of the key benefits of MVB is that 
buyers can factor in elements other than price. When two of the UK’s largest utility companies, United 
Utilities and ScottishPower decided that they were seeking suppliers to provide them with a mix of 
cars, vans and trucks for their vehicle fleets, they issued a tender document with a value of 250 million 
euro over three years. As well as price, factors like the repair and maintenance costs, residual values 
and fuel efficiency were important for both organizations. In conjunction with Eutilia both companies 
decided to utilise multiple variable bidding (MVB) in which buyers factored in all of the variables they 
are seeking from the contract.  
In this example, a total of 26 different auctions were held, making up three auction events covering 
cars, vans and trucks. This approach suited the buyer’s needs along with the time and cost savings 
enabled by participating. Participants did not need to travel to a physical auction and because suppliers 
were pre-qualified, their involvement in any further auctions would be even more streamlined. There 
is an immense amount of value added for the customer through this pre-qualification process and the 
fact that all products are thoroughly tested for their product quality and technical specifications. 
In total, the buyers received 167 bids and during the process the importance of Eutilia’s multi variable 
bidding approach emerged strongly. Manufacturers were invited to sharpen up their initial bids and 
this had benefits for buyers. In many cases, it was not the supplier offering the lowest price that won 
the auction but the one that could provide the lowest life cost. In addition, Eutilia believe that those 
suppliers that invest in customer service are often revealed as offering better value than competitors 
who quote a lower headline price.  
An important element in Eutilia’s auction system is the Dashboard. This enables buyers to see the bids 
during the live auction, and to list these using such criteria as bid time, ranking and whether the bid is 
on the total quantity or part of the quantity. Reports are available in Excel with the best bids and all 
bids listed in chronological order. An extension time mechanism is also available to enable bidders to 
react to a previous bid where it is deemed advantageous. The number of extension times may be 
limited. All of these decisions will be made by the buyers in conjunction with Eutilia.  
Up to recently bidders were not able to see the number of bids which had been entered in relation to an 
auction. In many auctions bidders saw the auction times being extended and they did not see anything 
happening unless they made a bid themselves, especially if the leading bid was hidden and they didn’t 
have a rank in the top three for instance. They saw the time being extended and nothing else 
happening. The system was changed to improve transparency. Bidders can now see bids coming in. 
They can therefore see how others bidders are reacting and this may stimulate them into making a 
revised bid. 
Eutilia are also leading the drive towards standardised products in the utilities sector. The advantage 
for the buyers is that they have a broader base of suppliers from which to purchase their products and 
it makes the task of procuring certain goods less uncertain. By not only pre-qualifying suppliers but 
products as well, buyers can be assured that all goods meet the specified technical standards and have 
been fully tested. 
A comprehensive set of IT tools and services are offered to suppliers to present their products and 
services to buyers. The application enables the creation, maintenance and distribution of customised 
catalogues. The system forces suppliers to answer questions in a specific format. Suppliers cannot 
release their offers until mandatory questions are answered. During the auction, Eutilia’s helpdesk 
supports up to 10 languages to facilitate a broad range of suppliers. Once the auction is closed, a report 
can be generated with the suppliers ranked under specific criteria.  
4.4 Communications and Computing 
The complexity of the buyer’s requirements and product offering necessitates that Eutila have a formal 
process for representing both in advance of and during a live auction. This is necessary as suppliers 
need to be able to customise their offering in light of competing bids, and the buyer has to be able to 
evaluate offerings across a number of criteria. 
Eutilia uses a formal series of processes to distribute information during the auction set-up and the 
auction event.  Incorporated in this process is:   
• Publication of the tender document  
• Invitation of pre-selected, commercially assessed suppliers 
• Helpdesk support during the auction to deal with queries. 
Eutilia’s proprietary eSource system provides all necessary information to buyers and suppliers to 
ensure that the auction is as transparent as possible. This system utilises the up-to-date encryption 
technology, and is protected by a series of firewalls. The system enables buyers to develop 
electronically and centrally stored tender documents. It also enables the buyer to communicate 
simultaneously with all bidding suppliers and support the efficient evaluation of responses. The 
application is available in three languages; English, German and French. This helps to extend the 
market reach by ensuring that suppliers from various countries can take part in auctions with language 
not being a barrier. 
The first stage in the process is to set-up the tender. Eutilia examines all the documentation which a 
buyer traditionally distributes to suppliers through ‘snail mail’. The tender is designed with weightings 
attached to specific criteria. Several answer formats are possible, and the buyer decides on the format 
and which questions should be mandatory.  
Once a list of suppliers is finalised, suppliers are contacted and invited to tender. This process is 
undertaken by Eutilia by distributing registration forms by email. Interested suppliers (bidders) return 
these registration forms. User IDs are then sent to these suppliers by email, with passwords distributed 
via phone.  
Bidder training events are then organized. This consists of Eutilia personnel being online with a 
supplier for half an hour in order to educate them on how to use the application. If there are 20-25 
suppliers, this process may take anything up to two days. Eutilia tried to automate this approach by 
providing an online demo, but abandoned this approach as they found that personal contact is 
necessary to build trust. While Eutilia believe that this process is necessary, it is expensive.  
Eutilia then tests the software to ensure that the buyers can view the dashboard. The auction execution 
room is then prepared and the helpdesk is set up. During the publication period, the buyer can monitor 
the event. For example, the buyer can check if specific suppliers have accepted the invitation, logged 
in to the event, or have worked on the tender. Eutilia is continuously communicating with the suppliers 
during this period in order to establish if they have any questions about the system or the tender. 
5 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
Evidence from our study illustrates that multi-variable electronic auctions can be used to procure a 
wider range of operating and manufacturing input that has been considered possible with traditional, 
price only, auctions. This is because such products can be effectively evaluated across a range of 
criteria in real-time if there is sufficient support from the intermediary for the process. In particular, 
the role of the intermediary changes to include greater responsibilities for authentication, product 
representation and communications/computing.  
This perhaps reflects the development of auctions over the last few years from mechanisms which 
only support a single negotiation element (price), to multi-variable auctions where the decision is 
based on multiple attributes. Multi-attribute auctions necessitate much more interaction between the 
intermediary, buyers and sellers, akin to the traditional face-to-face negotiation of deals from the past. 
They specifically require much more interaction between the buyer and intermediary with regard to 
planning, designing and structuring the auction. The relationship between the intermediary and 
suppliers is also much more complex as both suppliers and the products need to be pre-qualified and 
audited.  
Consequently, the intermediary develops a greater understanding of the value chain activities of 
buyers and sellers. It appears from our analysis that this understanding can lead to long-term 
partnerships between the intermediaries and various buyers and sellers. Such partnerships are likely to 
facilitate the type of co-operation that has traditionally been associated with systematic sourcing 
arrangements between buyers and sellers. This represents a move towards strategic sourcing where 
many operating and manufacturing inputs can be sourced using electronic auctions rather than 
horizontal or vertical hubs (see Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5.  Moving towards strategic sourcing 
In conclusion, we propose a note of caution. Buyers utilizing a ‘full-service’ electronic auction 
intermediary are likely to enjoy many of the benefits of both spot and systematic sourcing. However, 
the process activities by the intermediary may not aid the evolution of long-term, buyer seller 
partnerships. With the reliance on an intermediary for activities such as search, communication and 
product representation, we would argue that power and control of the buyer-seller relationship rests 
with the intermediary. Further research is required. 
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